0 PROBLEM OF TYPES IN HISTORY
consists in this, that not only not many ptrdicalw, but
that no predicate at all, can be affirmed of *i subject which
differs from it AntLsthenes granted as valid (inly those
predicates that were identical with the subject, Apart
from the circumstance that such statements of identity (an
(the sweet is sweet') affirm nothing at all and arc, there-
fore, without meaning, the weakness of the inherency
principle lies in this: that u judgment of identity has also
nothing to do with the thing; the word * grass * has literally
nothing to do with the thing *grasŤ/ The principle of
inherency suffers then in much the same degree an the
ancient word-fetlchism, which naively assumes* that the
word coincides also with the thing, When, therefore, the
nominalist calls to the realist; "You arc dreaming -you
think you are dealing with things, but in reality you arc
only fighting verbal chimeras", the realist can answer the
nominalist in precisely the same words ; for neither in the
nominalist concerned with things in themselves but with
; words, which he sets in the place of things, Even wlmn
for every separate thing he sets a separate word, yet they
are always only words and not things themselves,
Although indeed, the idea of <(energy" is admittedly
a verbal concept, it is nevertheless so extraordinarily real
that the electrical Company pays dividends out of it. The
board of directors would certainly allow no metaphysical
argument to convince them of the unreality of energy*
'Energy' simply designates the undeniable conformity
of the phenomena of force, which in the moat telling ways
daily proves its existence. In so far as the thing in real,
and a word conventionally designates the'thing, the word
also receives 'reality-significance'. In so far as the con-
formity of things is real, the generic concept designating
Jhe conformity of things also receives 'reality-signific-
ance'; furthermore, it is a significance that is neither
greater nor less than that of the word which designates